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I. INTRODUCTION

Private corporations contracting with the U.S. military have been crucial
to U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 But, as one might expect, the road
to victory is proving to be bumpy. On numerous occasions, military contractors
and their employees have been guilty of misconduct, ranging from simple
negligence to deliberate, sometimes egregious wrongdoing.2 When victims try
to hold them accountable through remedies provided by state tort law, the
question of whether and to what extent contractors in war zones should be
liable for their misconduct arises.
Many contractors in litigation have sought to benefit from the
“government contractor defense,” rooted in the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision
in Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation.3 The Court in Boyle held that a
product liability claim against a contractor for equipment it had manufactured
according to military specifications was preempted by the “uniquely federal
interest” in military procurement.4 In 2009, in Saleh v. Titan Corporation, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals applied Boyle and preempted state law tort claims
against military contractors providing translation and interrogation services at
Iraq’s infamous Abu Ghraib prison.5 Saleh is an important case because, among
other reasons, it represents the first appellate victory for military contractors
seeking to apply Boyle in civil suits and to immunize their war‐zone conduct.6
1

Adam Ebrahim, Note, Going to War With the Army You Can Afford: The United States,
International Law, and the Private Military Industry, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 181, 182 (2010)
(“Private military companies . . . play an unquestionably prominent role in the twenty‐
first century [U.S.] military apparatus, offering logistical support, strategic consulting,
and frontline combat operations.” (citing P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF
THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 88 (Robert J. Art, et al. eds., Cornell University Press
2008) (2003))).
2
See André M. Peñalver, Note, Corporate Disconnect: The Blackwater Problem and the
FCPA Solution, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 459, 460–62 (2010); Jenny S. Lam, Comment,
Accountability for Private Military Contractors Under the Alien Tort Statute, 97 CAL. L.
REV. 1459, 1461–64 (2009).
3
487 U.S. 500 (1988).
4
See id. at 505 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5
Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
6
Compare Saleh, 580 F.3d, with Fisher v. Halliburton, Nos. H‐05‐1731, H‐06‐1971, H‐06‐
1168, 2010 WL 519690 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2010) (preemption inappropriate under Fifth
Circuit precedent and Boyle because actions on which claims were premised exceeded
authority of government contract and state‐imposed tort duties did not conflict with
contract); Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 400 (W.D. Pa.
2009) (preemption inappropriate under Boyle and combatant activities exception
because case did not involve claims arising from active military combat operations); Al
Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 700, 720–25 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(preemption inappropriate under Boyle and combatant activities exception because
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This paper takes Saleh as a starting point for a broader discussion about
what the scope of liability for military contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan ought
to be. My thesis here is rather straightforward and may be stated in two parts.
First, where the application of state tort law to the conduct of military
contractors is at issue, the preemption analysis, in truth, masks underlying policy
choices by the court about the scope of contractor liability. Normatively
speaking, contractor liability may be assessed on the basis of a “liability rule” or
an “immunity rule.” The former would generally permit application of state tort
law to a contractor’s conduct except in limited circumstances. The latter,
conversely, would generally prohibit application of state tort law unless an
exception applied. Importantly, a court’s preemption analysis is often nothing
more than a judicial vehicle for adopting one or the other rule. A review of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Zschernig v. Miller7—the Court’s lone example of so‐
called “dormant foreign affairs preemption”8—shows how the theories of
conflict and field preemption are mirror images of the liability and immunity
rule, respectively, for contractor misconduct.
Second, with that essential connection unmasked, and taking a cue from
dicta in the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on foreign affairs
preemption, I suggest that courts faced with thorny questions about the liability
of military contractors in war zones should be more straightforward in assessing
the balance of interests at stake. In applying its tort law, a state has strong,
interrogation was not combatant activity, case did not involve “uniquely federal
interests,” and even if such interests did exist, imposition of state tort liability would not
significantly conflict with them); Lessin v. Kellogg Brown & Root, No. CIVA H‐05‐01853,
2006 WL 3940556 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006) (preemption inappropriate under Boyle and
combatant activities exception because military decisionmaking not implicated by
contractor’s provision of convoy services and case concerned liability of contractor to
U.S. citizens); Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 1373
(N.D. Ga. 2006) (preemption inappropriate under Boyle and combatant activities
exception because case concerned liability of contractor to U.S. citizen (soldier) and
would not require divulgence of military secrets); McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc.,
460 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1330 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (preemption inappropriate under Boyle and
combatant activities exception because “private contractors may not bootstrap the
Government’s sovereign immunity”); Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H‐06‐0462, 2006 WL
1342823 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2006) (preemption inappropriate under Boyle and
combatant activities exception because government contractor defense could not be
extended to suit by non‐military personnel against contractor for negligence in security
measures on military base).
7
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
8
See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 203
(2000); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We
have
not
relied
on
Zschernig
since
it
was
decided
. . . .”).
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legitimate interests in punishing and deterring wrongdoing by resident
corporations and providing compensation to resident victims (whether they be
employees of the contractor, U.S. soldiers, or otherwise). By the same token,
the federal government has a paramount and exclusive interest in the conduct of
war, although in some circumstances it may see state tort law as useful—as an
off‐the‐shelf mechanism for helping regulate contractor misconduct. Finally, in
weighing these interests, the culpability of a contractor or its employees should
be considered. Applying tort principles to mere negligence by contractors may
frustrate the federal interest in prosecuting a successful war (which generally
necessitates significant risk‐taking). However, the more reckless or deliberate
the wrongdoing is, the greater role state tort law has to play; similarly, the more
attenuated the federal interest because egregious misconduct may itself violate
federal law or policy.
Ultimately, I express no opinion on the D.C. Circuit’s ultimate resolution
of the Saleh case. I do, however, quibble with its analysis. The court might have
approached the question of contractor liability in a more pragmatic way, and it
might have crafted a narrower decision, one that left a court free to strike the
balance differently in a future case.
The rest of this paper proceeds in three parts. First, I review and
summarize the Saleh decision and, as part of that, discuss the government
contractor defense recognized in Boyle. Second, with reference to the Zschernig
decision, I explore the underlying connection between the paradigms of conflict
and field preemption and the normative choices about the scope of contractor
liability. Finally, I suggest that courts take a more pragmatic, case‐by‐case
approach to the question of contractor liability, and I articulate some of the state
and federal interests that should be weighed in that analysis.
II. SALEH V. TITAN CORPORATION, THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE, AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS PREEMPTION
On September 11, 2009, the D.C. Circuit in Saleh v. Titan Corporation held
that state law tort claims against two private corporations under contract with
the U.S. military in Iraq were federally preempted due to the “uniquely federal
interests” at stake.9 The plaintiffs in the case were Iraqi nationals who alleged
that they or their late husbands had suffered torture and mistreatment by
employees of two private contractors at Abu Ghraib prison.10 Abu Ghraib was a
U.S.‐run “correctional facility” in Baghdad, Iraq, and the site of horrendous

9

See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6–7.
See id. at 2; Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
10
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abuse—indeed, torture—of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. military personnel.11 The
plaintiffs alleged that defendants Titan Corporation, a provider of translation
services, and CACI International, a provider of interrogation services,
participated in the prison abuses.12
The central issue on appeal was the “government contractor defense”
that Titan and CACI put forth.13 The contractors asserted that the state law tort
claims against them “should be preempted as claims against civilian contractors
providing services to the military in a combat context.”14 The D.C. Circuit agreed,
resting its holding on two alternative grounds: “the Supreme Court’s decision in
Boyle . . . and the Court’s other preemption precedents in the national security
and foreign policy field.”15
A. Boyle and the Government Contractor Defense
Boyle, decided in 1988, was not the first case in which a government
contractor claimed immunity to suit. In 1940, in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross
Construction Company, the Supreme Court held that a contractor acting under
the direction and supervision of the federal government could not be held liable
for damage to the plaintiff’s land due to its construction of dikes on the Missouri
River.16 “[I]t is clear,” the Court wrote in a short opinion, “that if [the] authority
to carry out the project was validly conferred, . . . there is no liability on the part
of the contractor for executing” the government’s will.17

11

See Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42; Scott
Higham & Joe Stephens, New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge, WASH. POST, May 21, 2004,
at A1 (“Some of the detainees described being abused as punishment or discipline . . . .
Some said they were pressed to denounce Islam or were force‐fed pork and liquor.
Many provided graphic details of how they were sexually humiliated and assaulted,
threatened with rape, and forced to masturbate in front of female soldiers.”). The Saleh
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant contractors participated in and committed these
and other abuses. See Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13. The Abu Ghraib facility was
turned over to the Iraqi government in 2009 and reopened under the new moniker
“Baghdad Central Prison.” See Sam Dagher, Fresh Paint and Flowers at Iraqi House of
Horrors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at A10.
12
Saleh, 580 F.3d at 2.
13
See id. at 4–5.
14
Id. at 4.
15
Id. at 5.
16
See 309 U.S. 18, 19 (1940).
17
Id. at 20–21.
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Yearsley involved federal claims against a non‐military contractor under a
performance contract.18 Boyle might be seen as its converse, involving state law
tort claims against a military contractor under a procurement contract.19 The
plaintiff in Boyle alleged that the contractor, United Technologies, had
defectively designed the emergency escape hatch on certain helicopters
manufactured for the U.S. military.20 The hatch opened outward instead of
inward, rendering it inoperable due to water pressure when the helicopter was
submerged.21 The plaintiff’s son, a Marine pilot, had died as a result of this
defect.22 In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that
the state law claims against the contractor were preempted, and the Court went
on to fashion a federal common law rule to govern the case.23
1. Preemption
On the issue of preemption, the Court noted that “a few areas, involving
‘uniquely federal interests’ . . . are so committed by the Constitution and laws of
the United States to federal control that state law is pre‐empted and replaced.”24
For three reasons, the Court found that, indeed, “uniquely federal interests”
were at stake.25 First, though the case involved liability of a third party and not
the government, it nevertheless arose out of a government contract, and
Supreme Court precedent made clear that such contracts were within the
exclusive domain of federal law.26 Second was the “peculiarly federal concern”
with “getting the Government’s work done,” whether that involved a federal
employee carrying out his duties or a private party performing its obligations
18

Specifically, the Yearsley plaintiffs alleged that the contractor was liable for a taking of
their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. See id. at 19–20.
In Boyle, Justice Scalia noted that the claim in Yearsley was based on state law. See
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506 (1988). In Yearsley, the plaintiffs
appear initially to have founded their claims on state law. See W.A. Ross Constr. Co. v.
Yearsley, 103 F.2d 589, 590 (8th Cir. 1939). In reply to the contractor’s answer that it
was acting within the scope of its contract with the government, the plaintiffs “admitted
that the contractor was operating under a Government contract, and alleged that the
contract did not contemplate the taking of their land without just compensation and
due process of law, and that the contractor’s acts resulting in the destruction of a part
of their land was a violation of their rights under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.” Id. at 591.
19
See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502–03.
20
Id. at 503.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 502.
23
See id. at 512.
24
Id. at 504.
25
See id. at 504–07.
26
See id. at 504–05.
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under a contract with the federal government.27 Finally, the interests of the
United States were directly affected by government contractor suits because the
cost of any resulting liability would be passed on directly to the government.28
The preemption analysis did not end there.29 Having identified the
federal interests at stake, the Court went on to examine whether a “significant
conflict” existed between these interests and the operation of state law.30
Implicitly, this part of the Court’s analysis took place in two steps.
a. “Precise” Conflict Between State and Federal Duties
First, the Court examined the nature of the duties imposed by state tort
law and the government contract.31 It found a sharp conflict between them,
noting that a contractor could not comply both with the state‐imposed duty to
manufacture a “safe” escape hatch and with the duty imposed by the
government contract to manufacture the escape hatch called for by military
specifications.32 The one was “precisely contrary” to the other.33
b. Significance of Conflict
Despite the clear conflict, the Court acknowledged that this sort of
situation did not always present a significant conflict.34 The crucial issue was the
government’s interest in the “particular feature” subject to the conflicting
duties.35 The Court imagined a scenario in which “a federal procurement officer
orders, by model number, a quantity of stock helicopters that happen to be
equipped with escape hatches opening outward.”36 In such a case, it would be
“impossible to say that the Government has a significant interest in that
particular feature.”37

27

See id. at 505.
See id. at 506–07.
29
See id. at 507 (“That the procurement of equipment by the United States is an area of
uniquely federal interest . . . merely establishes a necessary, not a sufficient, condition
for the displacement of state law.”).
30
See id. (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
31
See id. at 508–09.
32
See id. at 509.
33
Id.
34
See id.
35
See id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
28
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For the conflict’s significance, the Court looked to a particular provision
of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).38 The FTCA waives the United States’
sovereign immunity in suits seeking damages for the tortious conduct of
government employees.39 The United States is liable to the extent that a private
person would be liable in like circumstances under the “law of the place” where
the conduct occurred.40 The FTCA thus incorporates state law rules of
negligence, duty of care, causation, and others.41
There are, however, a number of exception to the waiver.42 The Boyle
Court pointed to the so‐called discretionary function exception, a provision that
retains the government’s sovereign immunity for claims based on a federal
employee’s “exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function.”43
This exception is designed to shield “policy
decisions”—decisions calling for the exercise of judgment and discretion by
government officials—from private liability.44 The Court found that purpose
implicated in Boyle:
38

See id. at 511.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
40
See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
41
See Hetzel v. United States, 43 F.3d 1500, 1503–04 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
42
See 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
43
Id. § 2680(a).
44
See United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1984). Varig Airlines
involved tort claims against the United States for injuries arising out of the alleged
negligence of the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) in certifying certain aircraft as
safe. See id. at 799–803. At the time of the action, the FAA consisted of fewer than 400
engineers. Id. at 807. With limited manpower, the FAA safety certification process was
done through a “spot check” program: an aircraft manufacturer had primary
responsibility for the safety of the aircraft, and the FAA’s role was to police compliance
by inspecting a representative sample of the manufacturer’s aircraft and its various
features. See id. at 816–19. The intensity of spot checking was tailored to the
manufacturer’s track record. See id. at 817–18. The more experienced and well‐known
the manufacturer, the greater the FAA’s confidence in it and the less intense the
inspections required. See id. The Supreme Court found that the FAA’s spot check
program was “plainly discretionary activity of the nature and quality protected by” the
discretionary function. Id. at 819 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
explained:
39

Decisions as to the manner of enforcing regulations directly affect the
feasibility and practicality of the Government’s regulatory program;
such decisions require the agency to establish priorities for the
accomplishment of its policy objectives by balancing the objectives
sought to be obtained against such practical considerations as staffing
and funding. Here, the FAA has determined that a program of “spot‐
checking” manufacturers’ compliance with minimum safety standards
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We think that the selection of the appropriate design for military
equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary
function within the meaning of this provision. It often involves not
merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of many
technical, military, and even social considerations, including specifically
the trade‐off between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness.
And we are further of the view that permitting “second‐guessing” of
these judgments . . . through state tort suits against contractors would
produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption.45

“It makes little sense,” the Court continued, “to insulate the Government
against financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature of military
equipment is necessary when the Government produces the equipment itself,
but not when it contracts for the production.”46 It therefore concluded that
allowing for the imposition of tort liability on the contractor would produce a
“significant conflict” with federal policy and that preemption was warranted.47
2. Fashioning a Federal Common Law Rule
Bare preemption, however, did not end the matter. If that were true,
state law would have been totally displaced, and, without any federal law in
place to delineate the scope of the contractor’s liability, the contractor would
have been completely immune to state law tort claims. Instead, the Supreme
Court fashioned a federal common law rule to govern such claims:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed,
pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the
dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier
but not to the United States.48
best accommodates the goal of air transportation safety and the reality
of finite agency resources. Judicial intervention in such decisionmaking
through private tort suits would require the courts to “second‐guess”
the political, social, and economic judgments of an agency exercising its
regulatory function. It was precisely this sort of judicial intervention in
policymaking that the discretionary function exception was designed to
prevent.
Id. at 819–20.
45
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
46
Id. at 512.
47
Id.
48
Id.
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The Court explained that the first two conditions ensured that the suit
was one in which, if liability were imposed, the discretionary function exception
to the FTCA would be frustrated.49 The third was a kind of backstop provision.
Without it, the contractor would have the incentive to withhold knowledge of
risks, since informing the government might disrupt its contract but withholding
information would produce no liability.50 The third condition ameliorated this
perverse incentive and facilitated the sharing of information between the
contractor and the government, information “highly relevant to the
[government’s] discretionary decision.”51
B. Saleh’s Boyle Analysis
The D.C. Circuit saw the state law tort claims raised in Saleh as controlled
by Boyle.52 On whether the claims were preempted, there was no dispute that
“uniquely federal interests” were in play.53 Rather, the plaintiffs contended that
applying state tort law to the contractors did not produce a “significant conflict”
with federal policy “because the U.S. government itself openly condemned the
behavior of those responsible for abusing detainees at Abu Ghraib.”54
On this issue, the court of appeals proceeded immediately to an
examination of the Federal Tort Claims Act.55 However, the provision to which it
referred to delineate the scope of the federal‐state conflict was the “combatant
activities exception.”56 That exception to the FTCA’s general waiver for tort
claims against the United States provides that the federal government retains its
sovereign immunity for “[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the
military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.”57
The court in Saleh opined that this exception was even broader than the
discretionary function exception.58 For the latter, the court explained, one must
identify “a discrete discretionary governmental decision,” and all suits based on
that decision are preempted.59 The combatant activities exception, however,

49

See id.
Id.
51
Id. at 512–13.
52
Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
53
Id. at 6.
54
Id. at 7.
55
See id. at 6.
56
See id.
57
28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).
58
See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6.
59
See id.
50
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brought to the court’s mind a preemption doctrine called field preemption.60
This exception, the court said, “casts an immunity net over any claim that arises
out of combat activities.”61 The court explained that the arising‐out‐of test
denoted “any causal connection” between those activities and resulting injury.62
The court read the combatant activities exception as embodying a policy
of “elimination of tort from the battlefield.”63 The rationales that underlay tort
law—deterrence of risk‐taking, compensation of victims, and punishment of
wrongdoers—“are singularly out of place in combat situations, where risk‐taking
is the rule.”64 The exception evinced congressional intent both to preempt non‐
federal regulation of the military’s conduct during wartime and “to free military
commanders from the doubts and uncertainty inherent in potential subjection to
civil suit”—purposes equally implicated whether an alleged victim sought
damages from the military or from a contractor acting at the military’s behest.65
The court concluded that the “significant conflict” between state law and
federal policy in this case arose not because of a conflict between discrete duties
imposed by state and federal law.66 “Rather, it is the imposition per se of the
state . . . tort law that conflicts with the FTCA’s policy of eliminating tort
concepts from the battlefield.”67 This was thus a case of “battle‐field
preemption”: “[T]he federal government,” the court wrote, “occupies the field
when it comes to warfare, and its interest in combat is always ‘precisely
contrary’ to the imposition of a non‐federal tort duty.”68
Like the Supreme Court in Boyle, the D.C. Circuit went on to craft a
federal common law rule to protect the federal interest it had identified:
“During wartime, where a private service contractor is integrated into combatant
activities over which the military retains command authority, a tort claim arising
out of the contractor’s engagement in such activities shall be preempted.”69 This
rule must be contrasted to that adopted by the district court, which would have
preempted state tort law claims if the contractor was within the “exclusive
operational control of the military chain of command.”70 The court of appeals
thought this test did not fully protect the federal interests at stake because
60

See id.
Id.
62
See id.
63
Id. at 7.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See id.
67
Id.
68
Id. (quoting Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 509 (1988)).
69
Id. at 9.
70
See id. at 8.
61
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those interests were implicated in situations where military’s operational control
fell short of exclusive.71 Moreover, the district court’s rule created “a powerful
(and perverse) economic incentive” for the contractors in this case—in the
future, they would be deterred from reporting the Abu Ghraib abuses to higher
military authorities because such reporting might suggest that military prison
officials’ control over the contractor was not exclusive.72 The court of appeals
opined that the rule it had fashioned better secured the federal interests at issue
and mitigated any perverse incentive created by the contractor’s immunity.73
C. Analysis of Foreign Affairs Preemption Precedents in Saleh
While the D.C. Circuit’s Boyle analysis occupied the bulk of its opinion, it
also stated an alternative ground for its holding.74 Citing the Supreme Court’s
preemption precedents in the area of foreign affairs, the court declared that
“even in the absence of Boyle[,] the plaintiffs’ claims would be preempted.”75 In
this vein, it relied primarily on two Supreme Court cases: American Insurance
Association v. Garamendi76 and Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.77 A
brief review of those cases is in order.
1. American Insurance Association v. Garamendi
Garamendi involved a California statute, the Holocaust Victim Insurance
Relief Act of 1999 (“HVIRA”), that required insurance companies doing business
in the state to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe between
1920 and 1945.78 The object of the legislation was primarily to compel prompt
compensation by insurers who had defaulted on life insurance claims by victims
of Nazi persecution.79 The law also created a new cause of action against these
insurers.80
Meanwhile, the federal government had been making similar efforts at
restitution.81 These culminated in an executive agreement in July 2000 between
President Clinton and the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, under which
Germany agreed to establish a national fund for the compensation of victims of
71

See id.
See id. at 9.
73
Id.
74
See id. at 13.
75
See id. 12–13.
76
539 U.S. 396 (2003).
77
530 U.S. 363 (2000).
78
See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 409–10.
79
See id. at 410.
80
Id. at 409.
81
See id. at 404–05.
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Nazi persecution.82 Seeking to ensure that the fund would be the exclusive
means for compensation, President Clinton agreed that when a German
company was sued on a Holocaust‐era claim in a U.S. court, the executive branch
would submit a statement to the court recommending dismissal.83
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether the executive agreement
between the United States and Germany preempted the California statute, and
the Court held that it did.84 It found a “clear conflict” between the state law and
federal policy.85 The Court acknowledged that the California statute and the
federal agreement shared a broad common goal—compensation for Holocaust
victims—but their mechanisms for achieving this goal were different.86 The
California statute imposed more stringent disclosure requirements and, by
permitting litigation of claims in California courts, thwarted the United States’
interest in directing all claims to the German foundation fund.87 The statute thus
impinged on U.S. foreign policy as embodied in the federal executive
agreement.88 It “employ[ed] ‘a different, state system of economic pressure’”;89
it “undercut[] the President’s diplomatic discretion”;90 and it prevented the
President from speaking with “‘one voice’” with respect to the nation’s foreign
policy.91 Given its clear conflict with federal policy, the California law had to give
way.92
2. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council
At issue in Crosby were a 1996 Massachusetts law that prohibited state
entities from buying goods or services from companies doing business with
Burma and a subsequent federal statute imposing a set of mandatory and
conditional sanctions on that country.93 The federal law imposed an initial set of
economic sanctions on Burma (for example, prohibiting bilateral aid) but
authorized the President, under specified conditions, to terminate those
sanctions or impose others.94 The President was also authorized to waive any
82

See id. at 405.
See id. at 406.
84
See id. at 420.
85
Id. at 421.
86
See id. at 424–25.
87
See id. at 423–25.
88
See id. at 421.
89
Id. at 423 (quoting Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376
(2000)).
90
Id. at 423–24.
91
Id. at 424 (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381)).
92
See id. at 427.
93
See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 367–68.
94
See id. at 374.
83
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sanctions imposed by the act if he found them to be contrary to U.S. national
security interests,95 and was directed to develop a comprehensive strategy for
improving human rights, democracy, and quality of life in Burma.96
In a challenge to the operation of the Massachusetts law, the Supreme
Court held that it was preempted because it stood “as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of Congress’s full objectives under the federal Act.”97 First, the
state law undermined congressional policy delegating to the President the
authority to determine the appropriate amount of economic coercion over
Burma.98 Second, the state law imposed a different, more stringent system of
economic pressure; it was thus “at odds with achievement of the federal
decision about the right degree of pressure to employ.”99 Finally, the
Massachusetts law interfered with the President’s ability to act for the nation as
a whole and to carry out an effective diplomatic strategy to bring Burma in line
with U.S. objectives.100
3. Saleh’s Use of These Precedents
The D.C. Circuit in Saleh read both Garamendi and Crosby as involving
federal preemption of state law “not because the state law conflicted with the
express provisions of federal law, but because, under the circumstances, the
very imposition of any state law created a conflict with federal foreign policy
interests.”101 The court pointed out that neither Garamendi nor Crosby involved
any express conflict between state and federal law because companies could
comply with both the state and federal laws at issue in those cases.102 For the
court, then, those cases stood for the broader proposition that state laws must
give way when they are inconsistent with, though not necessarily expressly
contrary to, federal foreign policy interests.103 The Saleh court applied this
principle to case before it, establishing an alternative ground for its holding that

95

Id.
Id. at 369.
97
Id. at 373.
98
See id. at 374–77.
99
See id. at 377–80.
100
See id. at 380–82.
101
Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
102
See id. at 12 (“The state and federal law [in Garamendi] thus posed no express
conflict—it would have been entirely possible for insurance companies to disclose
information under California’s legislation and still benefit from the national
government's intervention should suit be filed against them in U.S. courts.”); id. at 13
(“[In Crosby,] despite the fact that companies could comply with both state and federal
laws, the Court explained that the state statute was preempted . . . .”).
103
See id. at 13.
96

2010–2011] Pulling Back the Covers

115

state tort law had to give way to the federal interest in exclusion of tort from the
battlefield.104
III. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS AS POLICY CHOICE
A. Normative Question
Before launching into a critique of the Saleh decision, it is useful to step
back for a moment and contemplate the important normative question that
Saleh raises: What should the scope of liability be for military contractors in war
zones? In the absence of action by the political branches, the judiciary has three
alternatives.
Under an absolute liability regime, contractors would be unqualifiedly
subject to state tort law. This would permit contractor employees (or their
survivors), U.S. soldiers, or other victims to pursue a variety of claims against a
contractor, including negligence, assault and battery, wrongful death, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.105 Importantly, under this scenario,
the limits on the application of state tort law would be few, and the federal
courts would play no gatekeeping function. The precise opposite of this regime
is a regime of absolute immunity. Under it, contractors would be completely
immune to tort claims, no matter how wrongful their conduct.
A third regime, one of qualified immunity, strikes a balance between the
previous two and comes in two varieties. Under one scheme, contractors would
be subject to state tort law, except in specified circumstances. Under a second
scheme, contractors would not be subject to state tort law, except in specified
circumstances.
The difference between these two schemes is the “baseline.” In the first,
the baseline is liability; in the second, immunity. In the first—call it a “liability
rule”—contractor immunity claims are given a narrow berth, and state tort law
applies to contractor misconduct unless some specific exception applies. The
second scheme—call it an “immunity rule”—casts a much broader net of
immunity over a contractor’s conduct and allows for operation and application
of state tort law in limited circumstances only.

104

See id.
See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom., Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
105
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B. Relationship Between Qualified Immunity and the Preemption
Paradigms

These alternative schemes of qualified immunity operate in parallel to
two doctrines of preemption. Specifically, the liability rule and the immunity
rule are, in substance, mirror images of the theories of conflict preemption and
field preemption, respectively. A review of Zschernig v. Miller,106 a 1968
Supreme Court case, helps illustrate these two theories and their relationship to
a qualified immunity regime for military contractors.
1. Preemption Paradigms in Zschernig v. Miller
At issue in Zschernig was an Oregon probate statute that prohibited
inheritance of property within the state by a foreign national unless American
citizens enjoyed a reciprocal right of inheritance in the foreigner’s home country
and the foreigner had a right to receive proceeds from the property “without
confiscation” by his country’s government.107 The statute reflected Cold War
resistance to Communist regimes of government, and Oregon, like many states,
was concerned that its probate laws would effectively enrich Communist
governments by allowing property to pass into the hands of foreign nationals
and thereby to the government itself, which refused to recognize the private
property rights of its citizens.108
The majority in Zschernig held that the Oregon law was preempted
because, as applied by the Oregon probate courts, it “affect[ed] international
relations in a persistent and subtle way.”109 Because the law required the
foreign heir to establish that he would enjoy the “benefit, use or control” of the
inherited property “without confiscation, in whole or in part, by” his home
government,110 the Oregon courts were led to make “minute inquiries [into] the
actual administration of foreign law [and] into the credibility of foreign
diplomatic statements” concerning property rights.111 The law, in short, invited
judicial criticism of authoritarian governments.112
106

389 U.S. 429 (1968).
See id. at 430–31.
108
See id. at 435; see also id. at 438 n.8 (quoting, among other cases, In re Belemecich’s
Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 511 (1963) (“[S]ending American money to a person within the
borders of an Iron Curtain country is like sending a basket of food to Little Red
Ridinghood in care of her ‘grandmother.’”)).
109
Id. at 440.
110
Id. at 432.
111
Id. at 435.
112
Id. at 440. The phenomenon was not confined to Oregon. Several states had such
laws, and the Court cited several state court decisions where criticism of Communist
governments was especially acerbic. For example, “[i]n Pennsylvania, a judge stated at
107
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In spite of assurances from the Executive Branch that the Oregon law did
not “unduly interfere[] with the United States’ conduct of foreign relations,”113
the Court found that “[t]his kind of involvement in foreign affairs and
international relations—matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the
Federal Government—is . . . forbidden . . . .”114 It conceded that that “[t]he
several States, of course, have traditionally regulated the descent and
distribution of estates.”115 However, those laws had to “give way” because they
“impair[ed] the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy.”116
Justice Harlan concurred in the result but disagreed that the Oregon law
impermissibly trenched on the federal government’s foreign relations power.117
On this point, he was joined (in substance) by Justice White.118 In Harlan’s view,
there was no bar to the operation of state law where a state had legislated in an
area of “traditional competence” and where there was no “conflicting federal
policy” on point, even if the state law had an “incidental effect on foreign
relations.”119 Harlan noted that probate law was within the traditional
competence of the states and that there was “no specific interest of the Federal
Government” with which the Oregon law interfered.120
Zschernig is an example of so‐called “dormant” preemption, whereby a
court preempts state law under its own authority, in the absence of any
particular federal law on point.121 It is the only case involving foreign affairs in
the trial of a case involving a Soviet claimant that ‘[i]f you want to say that I’m
prejudiced, you can, because when it comes to Communism I’m a bigoted anti‐
Communist.’” Id. at 438 n.8 (citing Harold J. Berman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 257, 257 & n.3 (1962)).
113
Id. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114
Id. at 436.
115
Id. at 440.
116
Id. at 440–41 (citations omitted).
117
See id. at 457 (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
118
Justice Harlan concurred in the result because he would have found that the Oregon
law was preempted by a 1923 treaty between the United States and Germany. See id.
at 443. Reaching this result required overruling precedent, which the majority declined
to do. See id. at 432 (majority opinion). Justice White thought the Oregon law was
preempted neither by the treaty (agreeing with the majority) nor by its supposed impact
on U.S. foreign relations (agreeing with Justice Harlan). See id. at 462 (White, J.,
dissenting). He therefore dissented because he would have upheld the state court
judgment below. See id.
119
Id. at 458–59 (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
120
Id. at 459.
121
Goldsmith, supra note 8; see also Ernest A. Young, Treaties as “Part of Our Law,” 59
AM. U. L. REV. 259, 332 (2009) (“Zschernig . . . suggest[s] the existence of a dormant
foreign affairs power.”).
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which the Supreme Court has applied a dormant preemption theory.122 Boyle,
too, is a dormant preemption case, although the foreign affairs aspects of that
case were minimal at best. Still, Zschernig and Boyle share the most important
feature of dormant preemption analysis: preemption of state law based, not on
express federal law (such as a statute or treaty), but on the impact that state law
has on some consummately “federal” matter, such as U.S. foreign relations or a
federal contract.123
The majority opinion and Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Zschernig
illustrate the theories of field preemption and conflict preemption, respectively.
Under field preemption, state law is preempted when the federal government
“occup[ies] an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the States to
supplement federal law.”124 This may occur when “the federal interest is so
dominant” in a particular field that enforcement of state laws on the subject is
precluded.125 Conflict preemption, on the other hand, occurs when compliance
with both state law and federal law is impossible.126 In such case, “preemption
follows by necessary implication from the fact of conflict.”127
The difference between field and conflict preemption is the degree of
conflict necessary to trigger preemption. When a court applies the theory of
conflict preemption, it generally requires an “actual conflict” between state and
federal law.128 This can arise when state law mandates what federal law
prohibits, or (vice‐versa) when federal law mandates what state law prohibits.129
The conflict, in other words, must be specific. By contrast, with field
preemption, no actual conflict need be identified. It is enough that state law
intrudes on an exclusively federal domain.130 The federal purposes and interests
that warrant preemption are drawn more broadly, not from any particular
122

See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We
have not relied on Zschernig since it was decided . . . .”).
123
See Goldsmith, supra note 8.
124
Nw. Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kansas, 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989).
125
Id. (citations omitted); see also CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW 398 (3d ed. 2009).
126
BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 125.
127
Id.
128
See Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L.
Rev. 685, 748 (1991).
129
See id. at 748–49.
130
See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (not identifying any specific conflict
between a federal and state law requiring registration of resident aliens, but
nevertheless concluding that the state law was preempted because immigration, as a
subset of foreign affairs, is the exclusive domain of the federal government and the
federal law “plainly manifested a purpose” to provide a single, uniform rule of
registration).
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provision of law (as in conflict preemption), but from the existence of a broad
regulatory scheme or from a federal interest existing apart from a particular
law.131
The majority opinion in Zschernig is an example of field preemption. The
Oregon probate statute did not interfere, either on its face or in application, with
any specific federal law. In fact, the statute did not even interfere with federal
policy since the Executive Branch had informed the Court that it had no
opposition to the law.132 Rather, the law was preempted because it amounted
to “state involvement in foreign affairs” and might “adversely affect the power
of the central government” to conduct foreign relations.133
By contrast, Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Zschernig exhibits the theory
of conflict preemption. Harlan thought the majority opinion was far too broad.
He was certainly open to the possibility that state law might be preempted in the
face of “conflicting federal policy.”134 Harlan found important, however, that no
such conflict had been shown.135 Oregon had legislated in an area within the
“traditional competence” of the states, and there was no “specific interest of the
Federal Government” that was impaired by the statute.136 In other words,
Harlan contended, there was no actual conflict here.

131

BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 125.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434 (1968); see also id. at 460 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
133
Id. at 436, 441 (majority opinion). In a separate concurrence, Justice Stewart made
this point even more strongly: “The Solicitor General, as amicus curiae, says that the
Government does not ‘contend that the application of the Oregon escheat statute in the
circumstances of this case unduly interferes with the United States’ conduct of foreign
relations.’ But that is not the point. We deal here with the basic allocation of power
between the States and the Nation. Resolution of so fundamental a constitutional issue
cannot vary from day to day with the shifting winds at the State Department. Today, we
are told, Oregon’s statute does not conflict with the national interest. Tomorrow it may.
But, however that may be, the fact remains that the conduct of our foreign affairs is
entrusted under the Constitution to the National Government, not to the probate courts
of the several States.” Id. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).
134
See id. at 458–59 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
135
See id.
136
Id. at 459 (emphasis added). Harlan criticized the majority’s reasoning for relying on
pure speculation: “[T]he Court does not mention, nor does the record reveal, any
instance in which [criticism of foreign governments by state court judges] has been the
occasion for a diplomatic protest, or, indeed, has had any foreign relations
consequences whatsoever.” Id. at 460.
132
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2. Connection to the Schemes of Qualified Immunity

Now, the connection between the judicial preemption analysis and
qualified immunity for military contractors can be made. In a case involving
application of state tort law to a military contractor, the court’s adoption of the
theory of conflict preemption is, implicitly, an adoption of a liability rule for
qualified immunity.
Conflict preemption analysis, like Justice Harlan’s
concurrence in Zschernig, rests on the premise that state law stands absent an
actual, specific conflict with federal law or policy. In the context of military
contractors, this means that state tort law applies to their conduct unless a
particular federal law or policy stands in the way. Boyle falls into this category:
it is a conflict‐preemption, liability‐rule case.
Displacement of state law, the Court wrote in Boyle, “will occur only
where . . . a ‘significant conflict’ exists between an identifiable federal policy or
interest and the operation of state law.”137 The Court made clear that this
conflict had to be both “precise” (such that the contractor could not comply with
both the duty imposed by state law and the federal contract)138 and

137

Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (citation, alterations, and some internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court added that preemption will also occur where “the application of
state law would ‘frustrate specific objectives’ of federal legislation.” Id. (citation
omitted). However, because federal legislation was not at issue in Boyle, and is not at
issue in Saleh, this alternative basis for preemption has been omitted from the
discussion.
138
The Court highlighted three situations in which a contractor’s duties under a federal
contract interact with state law. See id. at 508–09. First, the contractor’s duties under
state law may be identical to those under federal law (for example, state law operates
to enforce the federal contractual duty). See id. at 508. The example the Court gave of
this sort of situation was drawn from a previous case, Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S.
25 (1977), in which state law was allowed to determine whether third‐party
beneficiaries could sue to enforce a contract between a municipality and the Federal
Aviation Administration. See id. at 508–09.
Second, the state law duty and the federal contractual duty may not be
identical, but not contrary either. See id. at 509. The Court noted as an example that
the federal government might contract “for the purchase and installation of an air
conditioning‐unit, specifying the cooling capacity but not the precise manner of
construction.” Id. In such case, if state law imposed on the manufacturer “a duty of
care to include a certain safety feature,” “[t]he contractor could comply with both its
contractual obligations and the state‐prescribed duty of care,” and preemption would
not be warranted. Id.
Finally, it may be the case that the duty imposed by state law is “precisely
contrary” to that imposed by the federal contract because the contractor cannot comply
with both. See id. Only in this third situation was preemption potentially warranted.
See id.
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“significant.”139 Boyle, then, does not stand for the proposition that state tort
law is broadly preempted when a federal contract is at issue. Rather, Boyle is a
narrow decision. It requires a discriminating analysis into the actual content of
the duty of care that state law imposes and the duties assumed under the
federal contract.
Even where preemption obtains, state tort law is not totally superseded.
The three‐prong rule crafted by the Boyle Court was tailored to protect the
federal interests it had identified.140 State tort duties were displaced only if, and
to the extent that, the rule’s three conditions were met.141
The conflict‐preemption theory of Boyle thus masks an underlying policy
choice about the scope of liability of government contractors. Boyle’s
requirement that a specific, significant conflict be identified, and its narrowly
tailoring a federally protective rule, amount to a liability rule. Under Boyle, a
military contractor is subject to duties of care under state law, except in
specified circumstances.
In contrast to Boyle, when a court adopts a theory of field preemption, it
is, implicitly, opting for an immunity rule for qualified immunity. Field
preemption analysis imports broad ideas about federal power, and in the foreign
affairs context, this power is very broad indeed.142 In such a case, preemption
139

See id.
See id. at 512–13.
141
See id. at 512. Against this reading of Boyle, it might be objected that such “selective
preemption” has the potential to upset any balance struck by the state legislatures and
judiciaries in crafting regulatory regimes, such as tort regimes. Cf. Hoke, supra note 128,
at 688, 694, 696 (“American citizens often have focused their efforts on creation of state
and local laws to address critically pressing public concerns, such as environmental
damage, nuclear power safety, divestment from South Africa, [and others]. . . . [But a]
federal preemption ruling authoritatively revokes state and local governmental power
over the subject matter . . . [and] undermines the political space within which grass‐
roots citizens must act to modify governmental or legal policies.”). Moreover, that
balance is apparently one Congress sought to preserve by incorporating entire state law
tort regimes into the FTCA. See supra text accompanying notes 38–41. The response to
this objection is that taking a narrow view of Boyle and the preemption analysis helps to
preserve state regulatory regimes generally, superseding particular elements of them
only when the federal interest is truly supreme. As the Court explained in Boyle, “In
some cases, for example where the federal interest requires a uniform rule, the entire
body of state law applicable to the area conflicts and is replaced by federal rules. . . . In
others, the conflict is more narrow, and only particular elements of state law are
superseded.” Boyle, 487 U.S. at 508 (emphasis added).
142
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) (foreign affairs is a matter entrusted
“solely to the Federal Government”); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68
(1941) (“Any concurrent state power that may exist [in the field of foreign affairs] is
140
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will often follow, not from any actual conflict between state and federal law, but
simply from the fact that state law implicates the “uniquely federal interest” in
foreign affairs.143 This is especially true where state law does not bear on a
subject of “traditional state responsibility.”144 Thus, under a field preemption
analysis, the federal interest in the field controls, absent a strong countervailing
state interest. In the context of military contractors, where foreign affairs are
implicated, this means that state tort law generally cannot be applied to their
conduct. Saleh is this type of case: a field‐preemption, immunity‐rule case.
While the D.C. Circuit in Saleh declared that the case was “controlled by
Boyle,” it nevertheless distinguished that precedent. It pointed out that it was
relying on the combatant activities exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, not
the discretionary function exception as in Boyle.146 The former, the court said,
was broader than the latter.147 “In the latter situation, to find a conflict, one
must discover a discrete discretionary governmental decision, which precludes
suits based on that decision, but the former is more like . . . field preemption,
because it casts an immunity net over any claim that arises out of combat
activities.”148
145

Thus, the nature of the conflict at issue in Saleh was different from that in
Boyle.
While Boyle was “a sharp example of discrete conflict in which
satisfying both state and federal duties was impossible,” in the present case, it
was the “imposition per se” of state tort law that conflicted with the federal
policy, embodied in the combatant activities exception, of eliminating tort from
the battlefield.150 In perhaps its broadest statement of the law in the case, the
court declared:
149

restricted to the narrowest of limits.”); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(citing Hines for the proposition that “the federal interest [may be] so dominant [in a
field] that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject”) (emphasis added); see also Carlos Vazquez, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259,
1302–04, 1323 (2001) (reading Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council and Hines as
establishing a de facto presumption in favor of preemption where state law implicates
U.S. foreign relations).
143
Vazquez, supra note 142, at 1303.
144
See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 n.11 (2003); Hines, 312 U.S. at 68
& n.22 (contrasting state law regulating immigration to state laws bearing on more
“local matters” such as taxation, food and health laws, and transportation); cf.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 459 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
145
Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
146
See id. at 6.
147
Id.
148
Id. (citation omitted; emphasis deleted).
149
Id. at 7.
150
Id.
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The very purposes of tort law are in conflict with the pursuit of warfare.
Thus, the instant case presents us with a more general conflict
preemption, to coin a term, “battle‐field preemption”: the federal
government occupies the field when it comes to warfare, and its
interest in combat is always “precisely contrary” to the imposition of a
non‐federal tort duty.151

Saleh, then, despite formal adherence to Boyle, could not be more
different than it. In fact, it is hardly exaggerating to say that Saleh lies at the
opposite end of the spectrum. Boyle’s careful language and analysis preserved
the operation of state tort law generally, save in circumstances like those
presented in the case. By contrast, Saleh would displace all of state tort law,
casting a wide immunity blanket over military contractors in war zones.
In this regard, it is worth highlighting a confusing tension in the Saleh
opinion. After stating emphatically that state tort law was inapplicable to
military contractors in a battlefield context, the court went on, à la Boyle, to
“carefully tailor[]” a common law rule “to coincide with the bounds of the
federal interest being protected”152: “During wartime, where a private service
contractor is integrated into combatant activities over which the military retains
command authority, a tort claim arising out of the contractor’s engagement in
such activities shall be preempted.”153 Despite the court’s overtures to “careful[]
tailor[ing],”154 this rule is quite broad.
However, in a seeming retreat from its earlier comments, the court went
on to note, “We recognize that a service contractor might be supplying services
in such a discrete manner—perhaps even in a battlefield context—that those
services could be judged separate and apart from combat activities of the U.S.
military”—“although,” the court added parenthetically, “we are still puzzled at
what interest . . . any state . . . would have in extending its tort law onto a
foreign battlefield.”155
Somewhere in this ambivalence on the part of the court is the possibility
that state tort law can be applied to the conduct of military contractors in war
zones. There is no doubt, however, that Saleh announces a broad rule, and the
field (or “battle‐field”) preemption theory it articulates also masks an underlying
policy choice. The rule that the federal interest in military combat will “always”
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Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 8.
153
Id. at 9.
154
Id. at 8.
155
Id.
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conflict with the imposition of state‐imposed duties of care,156 subject perhaps
to narrow exceptions, amounts to a immunity rule for qualified immunity. Under
Saleh, a military contractor in a war zone will generally operate free from duties
of care under state law.
Linking conflict preemption theory to the liability rule and field
preemption theory to the immunity rule helps demonstrate that a court’s
preemption analysis is not some rarified, abstract judicial inquiry. It is, rather,
laden with policy choices about how military contractor liability should be
approached. For this reason, in the next Part, I suggest that courts conducting
preemption analyses where a contractor’s conduct is at issue should be more
straightforward in assessing the state and federal interests at stake in the
litigation.
IV. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO THE PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
Having thus contrasted the Boyle and Saleh decisions and uncovered the
underlying policy choice that each decision embodies, a critique of both
decisions, based on recent Supreme Court guidance on foreign affairs
preemption, is worthwhile. Above, the contrast between the theories of field
and conflict preemption was illustrated by reference to the Zschernig decision.
The tension in that case between the majority opinion and Justice Harlan’s
concurrence parallels the tension between the preemption paradigms that Saleh
and Boyle articulate.
Though the Supreme Court has never relied on Zschernig since it was
decided,157 it has hinted at how it might apply its principles in a future case. In
its 2003 decision in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the Court
suggested that where state law implicates the federal government’s foreign
relations power, the “choice between the contrasting theories of field and
conflict preemption” need not be a “categorical” one.158 Rather, “[t]he two
positions can be seen as complementary.”159 The Court then explained how a
dormant preemption analysis might look. In so doing, it seemed to favor a
pragmatic approach, one that looked explicitly to the state and federal interests
in play.

156

See id. at 7.
See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 439 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
But cf. Vazquez, supra note 142, at 1323 (“[I]t is only a slight exaggeration to say that
Crosby [v. National Foreign Trade Council] is a dormant foreign affairs case [like
Zschernig] in disguise.”).
158
See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 (majority opinion).
159
Id. at 420 n.11.
157
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A. Garamendi’s Dictum as Pragmatic Guidance
“If a State,” the Court said in Garamendi, “were simply to take a position
on a matter of foreign policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional
state responsibility, field preemption might be the appropriate doctrine.”160 This
was true regardless of “whether the National Government had acted and, if it
had, without reference to the degree of any conflict” because it is an established
principle “that the Constitution entrusts foreign policy exclusively to the National
Government.”161 On the other hand, if “a State has acted within what Justice
Harlan called its ‘traditional competence,’ but in a way that affects foreign
relations, it might make good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or
substantiality that would vary with the strength or the traditional importance of
the state concern asserted.”162 Lastly, the Court intimated that “the federal
foreign policy interest” also deserved consideration.163 It cited Boyle for this
proposition and spliced together two quotes from that opinion: “‘In an area of
uniquely federal interest,’ ‘[t]he conflict with federal policy need not be as sharp
as that which must exist for ordinary pre‐emption.’”164
To summarize the Court’s position: Where state law touches on U.S.
foreign affairs, a court’s first task is to examine the state interest embodied by
the law. The strength or traditional importance of that interest bears a direct
relationship to the degree of conflict necessary to trigger preemption. The
stronger the state interest asserted, the sharper the conflict with federal law or
policy must be in order to displace the state law. Conversely, where the state’s
concern is less compelling—for example, where it acts outside of a “traditional
state responsibility”165—the conflict need not be as sharp. Indeed, where the
state interest in the matter is especially weak, no conflict at all is necessary;
preemption may follow simply because the state has intruded on the federal
domain of foreign affairs.
A court’s second task is to examine the federal interest at stake. The
strength of that interest mitigates the degree of conflict that is necessary for
preemption. The more compelling the federal interest, the less a state law must
conflict with federal law or policy to be displaced. The converse is also true.
Garamendi’s dictum effectively transmutes the categorical choice
between field and conflict preemption into a balancing test that weighs the state
160

Id.
Id.
162
Id. (citation omitted).
163
See id.
164
Id. (quoting Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1988)).
165
Id.
161
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and federal interests and the conflict between them, if any.166 And because the
preemption doctrines, in cases like Boyle and Saleh, are but judicial vehicles for
policy choices about the scope of tort liability of military contractors, those
policy choices, it might be said, are non‐categorical, too. That is to say, a court is
not faced with an “either‐or” choice between a liability rule or immunity rule for
contractors. In effect, there is no operative baseline. Rather, the liability‐
immunity question should be approached on a case‐by‐case basis, with attention
to the state interest in regulating a contractor’s conduct, the federal interest in
combat operations and other “battlefield” activities, and the degree to which the
former conflicts or interferes with the latter.167 Garamendi’s rubric can thus
guide the assessment of whether, and to what extent, state tort law is applicable
to military contractors in war zones.
B. Critiquing Saleh and Weighing the State and Federal Interests
We now have a definitive basis for critiquing the Saleh decision. At a
basic level, the court’s preemption analysis may be faulted for the precedents it
utilized. That analysis took place in two, independent parts. The court wrote
“that plaintiffs’ [tort] claims are preempted for either of two alternative reasons:
(a) the Supreme Court’s decision in Boyle; and (b) the Court’s other preemption
precedents in the national security and foreign policy field.”168 As discussed,
those “other preemption precedents” were Garamendi and Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council.169 The court did not rely on Zschernig and mentioned it
only in passing.170
However, there are good reasons to think that along with Boyle,
Zschernig—not Garamendi or Crosby—should have controlled the outcome of
the case. The facts of Saleh most certainly implicated Boyle: the plaintiffs
sought to apply state tort law to the conduct of a military contractor acting
pursuant to its federal contract.171 The facts equally implicated Zschernig: the
defendants argued that state law was preempted, not by explicit federal law or
policy, but by the “federal interest” in foreign affairs.172
166

See Nick Robinson, Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the
Decentralization of Foreign Policy, 40 AKRON L. REV. 647, 661–62 (2007).
167
Cf. id. (under Garamendi’s dictum, “[t]o determine what severity of conflict is
necessary, the Court should weigh the respective state and national interests involved”).
168
Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
169
See id. at 12–13.
170
See id. at 12 (citing Garamendi, Crosby, Zschernig, and Hines for the proposition that
“states . . . constitutionally and traditionally have no involvement in federal wartime
policy‐making”).
171
See id. at 2; Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502–03
172
See Motion of Defendants CACI International Inc. to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint,
Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 1:04‐CV‐01248‐JR) (“The
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By contrast, Garamendi and Crosby are distinguishable. Those cases
involved state laws that conflicted with explicit federal law. In Garamendi, a
California statute was in conflict with a federal executive agreement in which
President Clinton agreed that a fund established by Germany would be the
exclusive means of affording compensation to Holocaust victims.173 In Crosby, a
Massachusetts law interfered with a federal statute establishing a scheme of
economic sanctions against Burma.174
In Zschernig, no such explicit federal law was drawn in view. The Oregon
law was displaced because it intruded on the federal domain of foreign affairs.175
The defendants in Saleh put forth a similar argument: state tort law interfered
with “uniquely federal interests” in combat operations.176
Garamendi and Crosby are examples of executive branch and statutory
preemption, respectively.177 As has been noted, Zschernig exhibits the theory of
dormant preemption, whereby a court preempts state law under its own
authority, in the absence of any express federal law or policy.178 Boyle is likewise
an instance of dormant preemption. As the Court explained in that case:
A few areas, involving “uniquely federal interests,” are so committed by
the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that
state law is pre‐empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law
of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the
courts—so‐called “federal common law.”179

foreign affairs implications of suits such as this cannot be ignored . . . .”); Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968).
173
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 406, 420 (2003).
174
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000).
175
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 436.
176
See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6–7.
177
See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 125.
178
Goldsmith, supra note 8; Young, supra note 121.
179
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988); see also Vazquez, supra
note 142, at 1302 (“[T]he dormant foreign affairs [preemption] doctrine shares
important attributes of federal common law.”). The Court in Zschernig did not craft any
particular federal common law rule in place of the Oregon statute; it merely held that
the statute could not be enforced. This may be an example of what one commentator
has called “null preemption,” whereby state law is affirmatively displaced but no
federal substitution is made. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1015, 1017 (2010).
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Thus, in addition to Boyle, Zschernig supplies the proper paradigm for the
Saleh case.180 This is not to say that Garamendi and Crosby are irrelevant, only
that the D.C. Circuit should have made Zschernig more central to its analysis.
Indeed, in light of the facts of Saleh, Zschernig is even more on‐point than Boyle
in one respect. Boyle involved U.S. military procurement of equipment from a
supply contractor181 and thus bore only a tangential relationship to foreign
affairs. In Saleh, by contrast, the tort claims were asserted by foreign nationals
and arose out of interrogation practices in a U.S. military prison in Iraq182—
making Saleh, like Zschernig, quintessentially a foreign affairs case.
It is of course true that the Supreme Court has not relied on Zschernig
since it was decided.183 However, as noted above, the Court in Garamendi
signaled that Zschernig remains good law184 and hinted at how it would apply
Zschernig’s principles in a future case.185 Consequently, the Saleh court should
have given the dormant preemption analysis in Zschernig, as perceived through
the lens of Garamendi, a more robust treatment.
1. The State Interests
Garamendi teaches that the selection of a conflict or field preemption
paradigm need not be a “categorical choice.”186 Consequently, the D.C. Circuit in
Saleh need not have distinguished Boyle so sharply as a conflict preemption case
and settled on field preemption as the rule for its decision.187 Rather, as our
discussion of Garamendi’s dictum above illuminates, the requisite degree of
conflict for preemption purposes should have been assessed only after weighing
the interests at stake in the litigation. The court’s might have begun by
180

Cf. Christina M. Manfredi, Comment, Waiving Goodbye to Personal Jurisdiction
Defenses: Why United States Courts Should Maintain a Rebuttable Presumption of
Preclusion and Waiver Within the Context of International Litigation, 58 CATH. U. L. REV.
233, 237 n.18 (2008) (citing both Boyle and Zschernig as “examples of judicial
preemption through federal common law”).
181
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502–03.
182
Saleh, 580 F.3d at 2.
183
See supra note 157.
184
See also Young, supra note 121, at 332–33 (“Zschernig was . . . resurrected and
greatly extended in Garamendi.”).
185
See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419–20 & n.11.
186
See id. at 420.
187
See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6 (“[The combatant activities] exception [to the FTCA] is even
broader than the discretionary function exception. In the latter situation, to find a
conflict, one must discover a discrete discretionary governmental decision, which
precludes suits based on that decision, but the former is more like a field preemption
. . . because it casts an immunity net over any claim that arises out of combat
activities.”).
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examining the state interest embodied by application of state tort law to the
contractors’ conduct.
In Garamendi, the Court wrote that if “a State has acted within what
Justice Harlan [in Zschernig] called its ‘traditional competence,’ but in a way that
affects foreign relations, it might make good sense to require a conflict, of a
clarity or substantiality that would vary with the strength or the traditional
importance of the state concern asserted.”188 Tort law falls squarely within the
“traditional competence” of the states.189 In a case like Saleh, the state whose
law applies is not simply “tak[ing] a position on a matter of foreign policy with no
serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility.”190 Rather,
through its tort system, the state is addressing its classic concern for the
punishment and deterrence of wrongdoing and compensation of victims.191
When it comes to the application of state tort law to U.S. military
contractors, the interests of the state are manifested on two fronts. First, a state
has a strong, legitimate interest in regulating the conduct of corporations that
incorporate or locate in the state.192 In Saleh, Virginia and California—home to
the two defendant corporations—may have been keenly interested in ensuring
that contractor employees were not engaged in unlawful behavior, including
torture.193

188

Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 n.11.
See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194–95 (2009) (calling tort law a “field which
the States have traditionally occupied” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (calling tort law an “area[] of
traditional state regulation”); Alexandra Reeve, Note, Within Reach: A New Strategy for
Regulating American Corporations That Commit Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 2008
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 387, 418 (2008) (“Traditional tort doctrines such as assault and
battery, wrongful death, or negligence present just such an example of traditional state
competency.”).
190
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 n.11.
191
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979); Ben Davidson, Note, Liability on the
Battlefield: Adjudicating Tort Suits Brought by Soldiers Against Military Contractors, 37
PUB. CONT. L.J. 803, 835 (2008) (“[T]ort liability systems are based on a set of distinct
goals, among them compensation for the injured, deterrence of disfavored behavior,
and punishment of the tortfeasor.” (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970)).
192
See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 30–31 (Garland, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 cmt. f (1971) (“[A] person is most closely related to the state of
his domicil[e], and this state has jurisdiction to apply its local law to determine certain of
his interests even when he is outside its territory. It may, for example, . . . forbid him to
do certain things abroad.”)); Philip A. Scarborough, Note, Rules of Decision for Issues
Arising Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 499 (2007) (“States
traditionally can regulate the conduct of corporations within their borders[.]”).
193
See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 30–31 (Garland, J., dissenting).
189
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Second, a state has an acute interest in ensuring that its residents receive
compensation for wrongs suffered.194 This concern does not implicate Saleh’s
facts since the plaintiff‐victims were Iraqi nationals.195 Nonetheless, that a state
resident may be subject to a military contractor’s tortious conduct while in a war
zone is not only conceivable—it is real. Consider the following, real‐life
scenarios:


Employees of a contractor, U.S. citizens hailing from a variety of
states, are providing convoy services in Iraq and are killed when their
convoy—a decoy for another convoy delivering fuel—comes under
attack. The employees’ survivors bring tort claims against the
contractor on the ground that it placed the employees at a
substantial risk of harm by failing to adequately protect the decoy
convoy.196



A U.S. soldier and resident of Pennsylvania is electrocuted while
showering at a military base in Iraq. The soldier’s estate alleges that a
contractor responsible for maintenance at the base negligently
caused the death.197



A U.S. soldier and resident of Georgia is permanently disabled after
being ejected from a truck driven by the employee of a military
contractor in Iraq. The soldier’s wife seeks relief, alleging that the
contractor employee was driving too fast and negligently failed to
maintain control of the vehicle.198



An employee of a civilian contractor in Iraq, a resident of Alabama, is
a passenger in a convoy vehicle operated by a military contractor.
The civilian is severely injured when the vehicle’s driver swerves to
avoid a dog in the road, causing the vehicle to flip and burst into
flames. He and his wife bring tort claims against the contractor.199

In each of these cases, the state is undoubtedly concerned with providing
compensation to its residents who have suffered harm, whether they be
employees of the contractor itself, soldiers, or otherwise. Indeed, some courts
194

Id. at 31.
See id. at 2 (majority opinion).
196
See Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
197
See Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 400, 403 (W.D. Pa.
2009).
198
See Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1275–79 (11th
Cir. 2009).
199
See Potts v. Dyncorp Int’l LLC, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1247–48 (M.D. Ala. 2006).
195
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have explicitly taken the victims’ identity into account in holding that state tort
law is not preempted.200
2. The Federal Interests
Garamendi’s rubric also directs a court to examine the federal interests at
stake in a preemption analysis. With respect to military contractors in war
zones, two discrete federal interests are in play, and they work at cross‐purposes
to one another. First is the paramount and exclusive federal interest in
conducting war. The states simply have no role to play here. Article I, section 10
of the Constitution states that absent congressional consent, “[n]o State shall . . .
keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, . . . or engage in War, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”201 That
the states surrendered their sovereign war‐making powers at the Constitutional
Convention has long been recognized.202 It follows that state attempts to
regulate the federal government’s prosecution of war cannot stand.203
On the other hand, the federal government also has an interest in placing
fetters on the conduct of the contractors it hires. It may perceive state tort law,
at least in some instances, as a ready‐made mechanism for ensuring that
contractors behave themselves.204 In 2008, the Department of Defense issued
regulations with respect to military contractors that contemplate this very
possibility:
200

See Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H‐06‐0462, 2006 WL 1342823, at *5 (S.D. Tex. May
16, 2006) (distinguishing prior precedent finding preemption of state law because
plaintiffs in present case, unlike in prior case, were U.S. citizens); Carmichael v. Kellogg,
Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 1373, (N.D. Ga. 2006) (same).
201
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
202
See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 382 (1821) (“The powers of the Union,
on the great subjects of war, peace, and commerce, and on many others, are in
themselves limitations of the sovereignty of the States . . . .”).
203
See Major Timothy M. Harner, The Soldier and the State: Whether the Abrogation of
State Sovereign Immunity in Userra Enforcement Actions is a Valid Exercise of the
Congressional War Powers, 195 MIL. L. REV. 91, 112 (2008) (“Federal courts have long
recognized that statutes passed by Congress pursuant to the War Powers clauses are
qualitatively different than those passed pursuant to its other enumerated powers. . . .
[T]he very nature of the sovereign federal government is that it can wage war, and raise
and support armies to do that, at the expense of the states, if such governmental rights
are at cross purposes.”).
204
See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 700, 722–23
(E.D. Va. 2009) (“[P]ermitting this litigation against [a military contractor] to go forward
actually advances federal interests (and state interests, as well) because the threat of
tort liability creates incentives for government contractors engaged in service contracts
at all levels of government to comply with their contractual obligations to screen, train
and manage employees.”).
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Contractors are in the best position to plan and perform their duties in
ways that avoid injuring third parties. Contractors are equally or more
responsible to research host nation laws and proposed operating
environments and to negotiate and price the terms of each contract
effectively. Accordingly, [these regulations] retain[] the current rule of
law, holding contractors accountable for the negligent or willful actions
of their employees, officers, and subcontractors.205

The preamble continues, arguing for a narrow application of Boyle—
specifically, that Boyle does not apply to service contracts “because the
Government does not, in fact, exercise specific control over the actions and
decisions of the contractor or its employees or subcontractors.”206
Of course, executive policy favoring application of state tort law to
military contractors is not alone sufficient to save state law from preemption.
Recall that in Zschernig, the executive branch made known to the Court that it
had no objections to the Oregon law at issue and that the law did not interfere
with federal foreign affairs prerogatives.207 The Court, however, preempted the
law on its own authority because it amounted to impermissible involvement of
the state in a foreign affairs, a matter exclusively within the federal purview.208
State tort law as applied to military contractors could suffer the same fate on the
ground that it constitutes state involvement in the conduct of war. Nonetheless,
that the Department of Defense not only permits application of state tort law to
military contractors but appears actually to welcome it is an important fact. It
makes the relationship between federal and state interests more harmonious
and calls for a stronger conflict before preemption is triggered.209
3. The Role of Contractor Culpability
205

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Contractor Personnel
Authorized To Accompany U.S. Armed Forces, 73 Fed. Reg. 16764, 16768 (Mar. 31,
2008).
206
Id.; see also id. (“Asking a contractor to ensure its employees comply with host nation
law and other authorities does not amount to the precise control that would be
requisite to shift away from a contractor’s accountability for its own actions. . . . [T]o
the extent that contractors are currently seeking to avoid accountability to third parties
for their own actions by raising defenses based on the sovereignty of the United States,
[these regulations] should not send a signal that would invite courts to shift the risk of
loss to innocent third parties. The language in the clause is intended to encourage
contractors to properly assess the risks involved and take proper precautions.”).
207
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434 (1968).
208
Id. at 435–36.
209
In dissent in Saleh, Judge Garland argued that it was the majority’s opinion that
interfered with Executive Branch wartime policymaking. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1,
29 (Garland, J., dissenting).
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A final factor to be weighed in the state‐federal balance is the
contractor’s culpability. Consider three degrees of culpability: negligence,
recklessness, and willful misconduct. It is fair to say that the degree of
culpability will vary (1) directly with a state’s interest in applying its tort law and
(2) inversely with the federal interest in combat.
When the D.C. Circuit wrote in Saleh that tort law is “singularly out of
place in combat situations, where risk‐taking is the rule,”210 it appears to have
had negligence, and perhaps recklessness, in mind. By all means, the court is
right. Concepts of “reasonableness” in the relative tranquility of American
suburbia do not translate well to the war‐torn streets of Baghdad. For example,
driving that may qualify as unnecessarily risky on a U.S. highway may be
eminently reasonable when transporting military supplies on a stretch of Iraqi
road known for insurgent ambushes.211 Tort law concepts of negligence and
even recklessness are simply inapplicable in these situations.
The federal interest in combat bolsters this conclusion. Successful
prosecution of war affirmatively requires risk‐taking.212 There is perhaps no
surer path to defeat than to require military commanders, soldiers, and
contractors to act with “ordinary prudence” in the midst of the chaos and risk of
war.213 Consider, for example, the Eleventh Circuit’s description of military
decision‐making with respect to certain fuel convoys in Iraq. The case involved
tort claims against a military contractor for negligently operating one of the
convoy vehicles, resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s husband:214
210

Id. at 7 (majority opinion).
Cf. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1289 (11th Cir.
2009) (In determining whether contractor employee drove convoy vehicle negligently
on dangerous stretch of highway in Iraq, “the question . . . would not be what a
reasonable driver would have done, or even what a reasonable driver in a ‘less than
hospitable environment’ would have done. . . . We do not face the question of whether
the defendants drove a fuel truck unsafely, say, on Interstate I‐95 between Miami,
Florida and Savannah, Georgia. Simply put, we have no readily available judicial
standard with which to answer this question.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
212
Saleh, 580 F.3d at 7; see also Kingsley R. Browne, Women at War, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 51,
111–15 (2001) (describing traits of courage, aggressiveness, and risk‐taking as critical to
battlefield success).
213
Browne, supra note 213; see Whitaker v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d
1277, 1282 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (ordinary tort concepts inapplicable to battlefield
situations). But cf. Potts v. Dyncorp Int’l LLC, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1253 (M.D. Ala.
2006) (court could decide whether driver, an employee of a military contractor, acted
negligently or wantonly because driver may have violated contractor’s internal policies).
214
Id. at 1275.
211
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The tragic accident at the center of this case occurred on May 22, 2004
during a military operation in Iraq. On that day, a military convoy of
vehicles had been organized to transport . . . fuel from Camp Anaconda,
a military base near the town of Balad, Iraq, . . . to Al Asad, the second
largest
American
air
base
in
Iraq
. . . . The fuel was carried in tanker trucks operated by [a military
contractor].
These convoy missions were highly dangerous: they unavoidably
involved traveling through war zones, frequently exposing them to
insurgent attacks in the form of improvised explosive devices (“IEDs”),
small‐arms fire, as well as shelling and rocket attacks. . . . Indeed, in the
two months prior to the May 22 convoy, insurgent attacks had become
so severe that convoy missions had been temporarily suspended. . . . As
a result, military bases faced fuel shortages, requiring many of them to
begin depleting their reserves. . . . In light of the urgent need for fuel,
the military decided to proceed with the convoy despite the many
risks.215

Clearly, then, the logic of war is not the logic of tort. In this kind of
battlefield scenario, imposition of state tort law undoubtedly frustrates the
federal interest in successful combat.216
These principles, however, are not all‐encompassing. The more reckless
or willful a contractor’s misconduct, the more likely it is that the contractor is
violating federal law or policy. Indeed, egregious offenses by contractor
employees may impede the federal government’s war effort because of the
severely negative image of the American government and military that results.217
For example, in the so‐called “Nisur Square Incident” in September 2007,
employees of Blackwater Worldwide, a private security contractor of the U.S.
215

Id. at 1275–76.
Davidson, supra note 191 (Imposing tort liability on military contractors “might
discourage
beneficial
behavior
. . . . The costs of liability might make military service contractors overly cautious in an
environment where quick decision making could mean the difference between life and
death or a mission’s success or failure.”)
217
See Charles Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement‐Aided
Unilateralism as a Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 23–24 (Abuses by
contractors at Abu Ghraib “‘aided the insurgency [in Iraq] by alienating large segments
of the Iraqi population.’ They also alienated world public opinion, boxing the United
States’ effort in Iraq into a unilateral status that seemed increasingly condemned and
isolated.” (quoting THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ 200
(2006)).
216
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government in Iraq, allegedly fired indiscriminately on unarmed civilians in a
crowded traffic circle in downtown Baghdad, killing fourteen persons and
wounding twenty others.218 The violence triggered immediate investigations by
the U.S. State Department, the U.S. military, the Iraqi government, and the
media.219 It “frayed relations between the Iraqi government and the Bush
administration and put a spotlight on the United States’ growing reliance on
private security contractors in war zones.”220
Where contractor misconduct is deliberate, as it allegedly was in the
Nisur Square Incident, and particularly egregious (amounting, for example, to a
violation of the laws of war), the federal interest in the successful prosecution of
war is significantly lessened. Rather, the interest of the federal government lies
in regulating or punishing the misconduct. For this purpose, it might pursue
criminal charges against the contractor,221 but, as discussed above, might also
perceive state tort law as a useful corrective. Moreover, the more deliberate
and egregious the misconduct, the stronger is the interest of the contractor’s
home state in punishing the wrongdoing and deterring its repetition in the
future.
4. Summary
To sum up, where contractor misconduct is alleged, a state’s interest in
imposing its tort law is twofold: regulating the conduct of contractors that
incorporate or locate in the state and assuring compensation for resident
victims. Of course, the federal interest in successful prosecution of war is
plenary, and the states play no role in this regard. However, military success is
as dependent on the “soft power” of reputation and image as it is on the “hard
power” of military assets. Because state law duties of care can be mechanisms
for controlling contractor conduct and for deterring and punishing wrongdoing,
the federal government may see imposition of state tort law as consonant with
its wartime interests. Finally, the culpability of a contractor’s behavior is
relevant: the more culpable the behavior—the more reckless or willful it is—the
greater the state’s interest in punishment and deterrence and the more
attenuated the federal interest in military success.
How does Saleh measure up? As noted, states like Virginia and California
(home to the two defendant contractors) presumably care about how their
corporate residents conduct themselves, whether at home or abroad. On the
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other hand, no state residents suffered injury in Saleh. The plaintiffs were Iraqi
nationals, significantly lessening the state interest in compensation of victims.
Consequently, to trigger preemption of state tort law, the conflict between
federal and state interests need not have been as sharp. Contrast Saleh’s facts
to the situations enumerated above, where the U.S. citizenship of the tort
victims militated strongly against preemption.222
The federal interest in military victory need not be restated. It was
present in Saleh, as it is in any case involving contractors in war zones, and the
court accorded it due recognition.223 The court did not, however, give any
consideration to the federal interest in allowing state law duties of care to
regulate contractor wrongdoing. The dissent made this point strongly:
The position [the Department of Defense] took in its rulemaking on
contractor liability may reflect the government’s general view that
permitting contractor liability will advance, not impede, U.S. foreign
policy . . . . The government may have refrained from participating in
the two cases now before us for the same reason. . . . [Its] failure to
defend the contractors may reflect the Executive Branch’s view that the
country’s interests are better served by demonstrating that “people will
be held to account according to our laws.” And the Executive may
believe that one way to show that “people will be held to account” is to
permit this country’s legal system to take its ordinary course and
provide a remedy for those who were wrongfully injured.224

Finally, as to contractor culpability, Saleh involved conduct that was
anything but negligent. The horrendous tales of sadistic abuse and torture at
Abu Ghraib, where Titan Corporation and CACI provided translation and
interrogation services, cannot be described as anything but deliberate
wrongdoing. Federal officials at the highest levels, including then‐President
George W. Bush, condemned the abuse in the strongest of terms.225 This was
not a situation in which application of state tort law would have interfered with
federal wartime policy. To the contrary, state tort law might have afforded a
remedy for deplorable conduct that in fact violated federal policy and was
denounced as un‐American.226 State and federal law were simply not in conflict
on this front.
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V. CONCLUSION
As civil suits against private military contractors continue to wind their
way through the federal courts, contractors, like those in the Saleh case, will no
doubt continue to invoke Boyle in their defense. In their preemption analyses,
courts should be mindful of the underlying policy choices that the preemption
paradigms represent. This will enable them to approach the question of
contractor liability in a more straightforward, pragmatic way.
My analysis in this paper can be recapped as follows. First, I pointed out
that, where litigants seek to apply state tort law to private military contractors,
the paradigms of conflict preemption and field preemption correspond to a
“liability rule” and an “immunity rule” for contractor conduct. Through the lens
of Zschernig v. Miller (an example of “dormant foreign affairs preemption”), I
then contrasted the Supreme Court’s decision in Boyle with the D.C. Circuit’s
recent decision in Saleh. Boyle, I argued, is a conflict‐preemption, liability‐rule
case. Saleh is at the opposite end of the spectrum—a field‐preemption,
immunity‐rule case.
With that contrast drawn, my second move was to suggest that courts
tasked with delineating the scope of liability of military contractors in war zones
should be more straightforward in assessing the balance of interests at stake.
Recent guidance from the Supreme Court in Garamendi directs courts to
consider the interests of both the states and the federal government. For
military contractor cases, I set forth what some of those interests might be and
how they interact with one another.
Through its tort system, a state has strong interests in punishing and
deterring wrongdoing by resident corporations and providing compensation to
resident victims. On the other hand, the federal government has a paramount
and exclusive interest in the conduct of war; of course, it may not view state tort
law as being in conflict with wartime objectives, at least in some circumstances.
In weighing these interests, the culpability of a contractor or its employees
should be considered. Imposing liability for mere negligence by contractors may
frustrate the federal interest in prosecuting a successful war, but the more
reckless or deliberate the wrongdoing, the greater role state tort law has to play
and the more attenuated the federal interest in wartime success.
None of this is to say that the D.C. Circuit got it wrong in Saleh. Nor, for
that matter, is it to say that the court got it right. My goal in this paper has been
to critique the court’s analysis and to suggest a different analytical paradigm for
determining the scope of liability for war‐zone contractors. At bottom, the court
in Saleh might have approached the question of contractor liability in a more
pragmatic way, weighing the state and federal interests that bore on the case.
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This would have motivated a more narrow decision, one that left a future court
free to strike the balance differently.

